Ethical Considerations in the Use of Transgenic Animals by Giraud, Raymond
Ethical Considerations in the 
Use of Transgenic Animals 
Raymond Giraud 
Stanford University 
Presented at San Francisco State Unhel'sity's 
Symposium on the Societal and Ethical 
Issues of Reincombinant DNA, Session IV: 
''Transgenic Animals and their Uses," held 
at the University of California at Santa 
Cruz, August 22,1990. 
It may seem strange that a professor of literature should 
be addressing biologists on ethical issues related to 
recombinant DNA. My literary interests and teaching, 
however, have been concentrated for some years on 
what Jean-Paul Sartre called litterature engagee, writing 
that confronts political and social issues, that is 
consciously in and of the world and involved in the 
transformation of reality, rather tIlan standing outside it. 
Together with other like-minded faculty, I also got 
involved in political struggles at Stanford during the era 
of university complicity in the conduct of the war in 
Vietnam. 1hat was a time when many in the academic 
world were moved to undertake an analysis of the 
university's function in society, to criticize its 
"corporatization," and to patticipate in adversatial action 
against its administrative leadership on many fronts. 
But the expression of ethical qualms about the 
political impact of the university in the world ought 
not to be limited to extra-curricular activity. Ethical 
issues in academe are too often subordinated to skill 
development and the transmission of ideas, with scant 
attention paid to their moral implications. Teaching also 
often tends toward the promotion of careerism and a 
conception of success narrowly defined in tenns of 
professional achievement (for one's students and also 
for oneself). 
Like many others, I have also come to the conviction 
that the struggle for human rights and social justice 
cannot be isolated from concern for the welfare and the 
rights of nonhuman animals, whose exploitation and 
abuse have taken place on a scale that dwarfs that of 
even the most oppressed human beings. As a result, of 
course, a number of my friends in the medical school, 
allies in other struggles, are now on the other side of 
the fence. Even so, many thoughtful scientists have 
serious reservations about the biotechnical revolution 
and, not least among its marvels, the creation of 
transgenic animals. 
It is eminently understandable to view the 
development of transgenic animals as an exciting area 
of research, a new technology, promising new 
biologically engineered solutions to many important 
problems-among them, food and health. 
But, like many other areas of modem scientific 
research and development, the history ofbiotechnology 
has also been marked by less altruistic promises: fame, 
promotion, and, of course, financial reward for 
individuals, as well as immense potential profits for the 
institutions that employ them. 
For some universities, grants from the National 
Institutes of Health have become so important in the 
budget that they have taken the place of the Department 
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of Defense funding that these institutions had come 
to be heavily dependent on during the Vietnam war. 
With the new sources of income provided by the 
biotechnology revolution, in which the creation of 
transgenic animals is now at the forefront, both 
individuals and institutions have flung themselves into 
a race for patents, with the prospect of wealth beyond 
the dreams of avarice. 
I shall not make the mad scientist or "Frankenstein" 
argument, accusing biologists of seeking to play God 
by tampering with the divine scheme of providence. 
But there is a variant of that argument that more than 
one scientist has invoked, quite independently of any 
fundamentalist religious dogma: namely, the risk of 
replacing the evolutionary process with a humanly 
engineered universe of artificially created plants and 
animals, including perhaps engineered human animals 
as well. A colleague of mine at Stanford, biology 
Professor Dow Woodward, for example, recently 
invoked the risk of a "genetically engineered world 
replacing the one produced by natural selection," going 
on to say: "What is already on the drawing boards of a 
few people shows an audacity roughly comparable to 
that of last century's eugenicists." Others who have 
issued comparable warnings include George Wald of 
Harvard, Erwin Chargaff of Columbia and Robert 
Sinsheimer of Cal. Tech. But important as prudence in 
these matters might seem, it often runs afoul of very 
powerful inducements to go full speed ahead and, as it 
were, damn the torpedoes. 
Among the moral issues that I believe biologists 
might consider encouraging their students to reflect on 
is, first and foremost. the pain suffered by the animals. 
Many thoughtful ecologists who contemplate our 
manipulation of animals of other species than our own 
are troubled by a fear that the evolutionary process will 
be affected or that Nature's rich array of species will be 
impoverished. What is often forgotten, however, is that 
for the individuals ofa species, there can also be intense 
pain and terror, not to speak of the almost inevitable 
deprivation of life. One might call this an ontogenic 
concern, as opposed to the predominantly phylogenic 
concern ofecologists. These hurts and deprivations are 
far from being negligible, as, for example, when medical 
researchers take a blow torch to the body of a living 
pig in order to study the pathology of bums or break 
the back of a rat to learn how that affects the animal's 
capacity for penile erection. In these, as in an almost 
infinite number of other experiments-many of them 
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useless by any reasonable standard-the researcher's 
right to know, and possibly to profit from the knowledge 
acquired, collides with the individual animal's right not 
to be mistreated in this way. 
Similarly, in the creation of transgenic animals, pain 
is a factor that should not be left out of whatever 
equations one constructs: pain for the fleshy pigs whose 
skeleton is inadequate to bear added weight, for cows 
whose distended udders scrape the ground and make it 
difficult for them to walk. The only sensitive comment 
on this that I have so far encountered in a scientific 
journal was a letter from a Canadian veterinarian 
published in Nature, I believe, in which he protested 
the neglect of this consideration in the literature he had 
read about transgenic animals. (He was referring 
specifically to the physical discomfort implicit in the 
introduction of genetic characteristics intO an organism 
unprepared for them by its previous evolutionary 
development) 
Also among the innocent victims of this sort of 
experimentation are the millions of transgenic mice who 
are sacrificed (the word of choice among researchers), 
in the ratio of thousands used to produce one mouse in 
whom a gene is successfully implanted-that is in such 
a way that the genetic characteristic actually expresses 
itself in the animal. 
It is well known that AIDS, in the form that afflicts 
human beings, is a condition-"a syndrome"-that has 
not naturally manifested itself in other species. Yet. a 
medical technology that has refused to liberate itself 
from the obsolete procedure of seeking cures for 
human ailments and injuries by making healthy 
nonhuman animals sick or injuring them is still engaged 
in attempts to create artificially a transgenic animal that 
will carry the virus, despite the misgivings of many 
researchers who believe that clinical studies offer the 
best hopes of success. 
We have, I believe, a moral obligation to consider 
what effect is produced on an animal-any sentient 
creature--by introducing a genetic characteristic that 
is not part of its own species history, a change imposed 
invasively only to make use of the animal for some 
purpose alien to its own being. 
That purpose can, in fact, be very self-serving 
(publication, prestige, profit). There was, for example, 
not much interest in AIDS in the bio-medical industry 
before the money started flowing. I know of at least 
two of my colleagues at Stanford, who run what are 
known in the medical school as "mouse factories," who 
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expanded into the AIDS business with loud cries about 
their service to humanity and have just started up their 
own profit-making companies. We may justly question 
the ethics of scientists who seek to enrich themselves 
not only through the suffering of countless animal 
victims, but also from research initially funded by grants 
of the taxpayers' money. 
We should also not forget that the bio-medical use 
of animals has mushroomed into a multibillion-dollar 
industry, including, amid the breeding for sale of many 
species, a veritable explosion of marketable strains of 
transgenic mice. The manufacture of food, cages, 
stereotaxic devices and a multitude of high-priced 
gadgets, is an immense business. For a glimpse at some 
of its not always visible dimensions, study the trade 
magazine Lab Animal. This week, Stanford's 
Department of Comparative Medicine is hosting what 
it calls a "rodent seminar," complete witll refreshments 
(wine and cheese!), sponsored by the Charles River 
Breeding Laboratories, the world's largest lab animal 
factory--{)ne example among many of the ties between 
today's universities and the corporate world. (See 
Martin Kenney's book, Biotechnology: The University-
Industrial Complex, Yale Univ. Press, 1986, for a wealth 
of documentation on this.) 
I might here invoke two of those major moral 
concepts that we presumably honor in our conduct 
toward other human beings (although often more in the 
breach than in the observance), but which we dismiss 
out of hand when it comes to our treatment of non-
human animals: 
MIGHT DOES NOT MAKE RIGHT. There is no 
question that we could not do what we do to 
animals if they were not powerless to resist us. 
What we do is "right" only for those who embrace 
an ethical philosophy tllat legitimizes power. 
THE END DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE MEANS 
used to attain it. (See Simone de Beauvoir's Pour 
une morale de I'ambig urte for a perceptive 
analysis of this often grossly simplified issue.) 
Assuming that the ends sought by the creation and 
use of transgenic animals are desirable (an 
assumption that deserves to be freshly questioned 
in each instance), does this end justify the means? 
How legitimate is it to "use" sentient creatures as 
means to an end? Moral philosophers have long 
argued against treating human beings as means 
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to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. 
Kant's is doubtless the most familiar formulation 
of the concept: "So act as to treat humanity, 
whether in thine own person or in that of any 
other, in every case as an end withal, never as 
means only." On the threshold of the twenty-first 
century, we ought to be morally advanced enough 
not only to actualize at long last that precept for 
human beings, but to consider its extension to 
nonhuman animals. 
Or are we to cling to our self-appointed role of 
master species, as some of us refuse to relinquish the 
myth that they are a master race or a master gender? 
Are nonhuman animals so alien, so inferior to us, as 
Jews and gypsies were to the Nazis and people of color 
to white supremacists, that we are morally at liberty to 
discard ethical principles when it comes to what we do 
with and to them? 
Certainly, in practice our species has proceeded 
generally on that assumption, and has used nonhuman 
animals as economic resources to exploit and as 
products for consumption. To abandon these practices 
and the attitudes that legitimize them will doubtless 
represent a revolutionary ideological and behavioral 
change for humankind. We might recall, however, that 
it has been only recently in the history of our species 
that the legitimacy of slavery can1e into serious question 
(for example, the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
resisted proposals to deal with the issue in that 
document), as well as the use of women for breeding 
children and for cheap labor. In fact, the treatment of 
women as theproperty of their husbands and as amorally, 
intellectually and physically inferior "subspecies" 
continues unabated in many areas of the world. 
In theory, too, we have still not liberated ourselves 
(or our nonhuman animal victims) from the archaic idea 
that even very bright men, like the great 17th-century 
French philosopher and scientist Rene Descartes, clung 
to, namely, that nonhuman animals are soulless 
automatons, animated not by thought or feelings, but 
by some sort of clockwork mechanism. 
Today's scientists who try to still their conscience 
as well as ours by denying animals of species other than 
our own the capacity to think and have emotions and 
feelings, including pleasure and pain, must confront the 
contradiction between that anthropocentric fallacy and 
the practice of exploiting animals because they are like 
us and may even be related to us (assuming we don't 
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wish totally to repudiate Darwin-who wrote, 
incidentally, with great wannth of individual animals 
for whom he had come to have real affection and a 
strong feeling of kinship). 
The engineering of transgenic animals inevitably 
brings to mind all the disputes abouteugenics, as applied 
to the "improvement" of domesticated animals and 
human beings~notion that received much attention 
in Hitler's Germany, but which had been conceived and 
practiced earlier and is still with us. 
There is, however, a substantial difference between 
the relatively slow process of selective breeding (not 
natural selection, but selective by human design) and 
what has come to be called genetic engineering, even 
though some of the scientists working in this field 
minimize the distinction, obviously because they hope 
that will make what they are doing seem less disturbing. 
(A striking example is the 1987 statement on 
"Introduction of Recombinant DNA-Engineered 
Organisms into the Environment" issued by the National 
Academy of Sciences.) It is true that both practices are 
alike in that they thwart the slow natural evolutionary 
process, but genetic engineering is far more radically 
invasive of the organism and destructive of its integrity. 
But just how sacred is the "natural" evolutionary 
process? A group of scientists recently made modest 
newspaper headlines by declaring that we have always 
tampered with "nature" and that an absolute opposition 
to any interference with a "natural" environment calls 
into question practically all of human history. Their 
gambit seems to me on the order of setting up a straw 
man, the demolition of which proves very little. Of 
course, we have always "tampered with nature"; only 
the most benighted dogmatist would pretend otherwise. 
But it is equally evident that we have not always done 
so very wisely. Witness the massive deforestations 
both past and present and today's truly criminal 
destruction of the environment. The real question is: 
how far do we go? Can we best deal with this problem 
by concocting a rigid formula for setting bounds to 
our interventions or should we be unrelentingly critical 
and constantly reevaluating a situation that is not fixed 
and permanent, but in perpetual flux? Above all, when 
the interests-indeed, the very live8-{)f groups other 
than the "tamperers" are involved, must there not be 
ethically guided control? 
To pursue this line rigorously means to question the 
moral value, as well as the feasibility and utility, ofevery 
invention or innovation that promises to alter the 
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conditions ofour existence and that of the other animals 
with whom we share the earth. Moreover, the questions 
and the decisions that follow them ought not to be left 
to scientists. In a democratic society, we should all claim 
the right to participate in decisions that affect all the 
inhabitants of the planet. 
The question is thus not whether we are to refrain 
absolutely from transforming the world we live in. 
Rather, we, as thinking beings whose consciousness (or 
conscience) has come to require ethical decisions, must 
assume responsibility for oversight and regulation of 
the changes proposed by scientific activists. 
This issue is related to what Jeremy Rifkin calls the 
"desacralization" of nature. In an argument he 
developed in his 1983 book AlgenYt Rifkin describes 
the success of a mechanistic model of the universe, 
laying particular stress on the triumph of the Darwinian 
conception of evolution, which Rifkin sees as leading 
to the present-day mechanistic ideology of the genetic 
engineers-and, for that matter, of behaviorists like the 
late B.E Skinner and the sociobiologists. For Rifkin, 
desacralization "allows human beings to repudiate the 
intimate relationship and likeness that exist between 
ourselves and all other things that live." 
Rifkin's analysis of the profanization of nature and 
desacralization ofanimals is consonant with his critique 
of the reductionist definition of life as a code to be 
deciphered and of living entities as so many bundles of 
information. To be sure, that has become an important 
aspect of our contemporary conception of what a life-
form is, what with the development of both DNA 
technology and computers, and also with what I might 
call the desubjectijication of life in this century, in both 
the capitalist and the socialist countries. It should also 
be evident, however, that these perceptions amount to 
only a small segment of our experience of the total 
phenomenon of life. 
What place does this reductionist vision offer to the 
ethical considerations which are not part of the 
genetically transmitted "code" of life, but which are 
inseparable from the human race's history-not only 
the history that others have made in the past, but the 
history that we ourselves have the capacity to participate 
in making and which, when all is said and done we 
may well deem the most precious part of our identity? 
There are other kinds of reductionism relatable to 
that of the mechanistic biological engineer, among them 
that view of economic and political behavior that 
minimizes moral factors so as to enable those who 
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control our society-like those who have come to 
dominate some areas of scientific activity-to 
subordinate ethical considerations to the quest for 
power and wealth. In what is now being called 
"corporate culture" (and, sad to say, university "culture" 
too), this can mean that the material success of the 
institution transcends the individuals who constitute it, 
although the individual is presumed to find personal 
fulfillment in helping the institution to realize its goals. 
It is that kind of thinking that has facilitated the 
corporatization of many of our universities-those (like 
the University of California, for example) that we call 
"public," as well as those that call themselves "private" 
(like Stanford). 
Our choice is, therefore, not simply between 
secularism and retaining a belief in the "sacredness" of 
life. Without having a set of beliefs consistent with those 
of the established supernatural religions, without 
divinizing "Mother Nature," one may still reject or at 
least be skeptical of the impoverished mechanistic 
reductionist conception of life that we associate with 
both Descartes and Skinner. 
Compare the present ideology of the scientific 
establishment (as represented by some of its avatars, 
like the American Medical Association, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, the 
National Academy ofSciences and the great established 
research universities), characterized by its reverence for 
material achievement, with Albert Schweitzer's doctrine 
of reverence for life, mindful that he, too, was a scientist, 
a practicing physician, and not a comic-strip guru. 
Which do we want to impart to our students? 
Do we want students at our universities to be 
coopted into a creed of greed, that subordinates humane 
values to financial gain (a concept that also expresses 
itself in oppressive labor policies and indifference to 
political and social justice)? Do we want them to 
internalize the values of academic administrators who 
have supported the selling of the universities to 
corporate interests and the racist apartheid regime in 
South Africa with their investment policies and 
continued war research and the production of nuclear 
weapons as part of the university's mission? 
Are these the attitudes, the goals, the values we 
prize? Let us not be naive. Neither the universities' 
institutional behavior nor their ideology is truly 
impartial or neutral. Our science is not value-free, and 
we should have the candor to recognize that. Our 
science, like our other institutions, is oriented toward 
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the maximization of profits and the minimization of 
human values and ethical concerns. (Indeed, we have 
seen something of a new discipline developing in some 
faculties: the study of ethics as a branch of learning 
dedicated to legitimizing in pseudo-ethical terms what 
humane ethics condemns as monstrous and inhumane.) 
What then is our bottom-line choice? I suggest 
that it is, broadly speaking, between two ethics, two 
courses of action: 
A.The perpetuation of a mechanistic science 
dedicated to the survival of a profit- and power-
oriented society. We might also recognize that 
the treatment of both human and nonhuman 
animals as objects under our control and made 
to serve our ends, instead of as conscious 
subjects-what Rifkin calls desacralization-
reflects an ethic of domination, in which control 
of both animals and humans is associated with a 
general domination of nature. At least since the 
Renaissance, our civilization ("Western Civili-
zation") has seen nature as our adversary, to be 
fought, conquered, mastered, harnessed, "raped," 
and, ofcourse, exploited for economic advantage--
an aggressive, invasive, selfish and totally 
anthropocentric and doubtless phallocenttic view 
of the world. 
B. The inculcation of an ethic of compassion and 
empathetic understanding that respects the 
subjective experience of other sentient beings, 
both human and nonhuman, and an intellectual 
attitude that questions authority, distances itself 
from subservience to the corporate world and to 
those who seek to corrupt our institutions of 
higher learning by making them dependent on it 
for trickle-down handouts. 
Is what I have said tantamount to intransigent 
opposition to any modification of the genetic structure 
of animals? Not quite. I can conceive of legitimate 
applications of genetic research, provided that they are 
not exploitive of human or animal subjects (i.e. 
acknowledging their subjectivity) or inconsistent with 
their welfare. That would, I fear, rule out almost 
everything presently going on in our laboratories, 
because the welfare of the nonhuman animals 
experimented on there is totally disregarded. Transgenic 
animals are being created primarily to benefit corporate 
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interests, researchers and the institutions they serve. 
Most are condemned to death and even the survivors 
are treated as objects without moral value. 
One last word. If the subject is not to be exploited, 
even benevolent action intended to promote its welfare 
presents a moral issue. Can it be imposed without being 
invasive? The "informed consent" that only recently 
has been required for experimentation on human 
subjects is obviously out of the question for nonhuman 
animals. It is, therefore, imperative that their interests 
be represented, however imperfectly, by human 
advocates. I should like to believe that some of those 
advocates who will lend their voice to speak on behalf 
of the animals will be found among our students. Why 
should they not include students of biology-the 
science that studies and that should respect-if not 
revere- life? 
Star-Nosed Mole 
To live beneath the earth 
Is to change. You must learn 
To swim without water. 
Your bones become coral. 
Your hands grow wide as 
Paddles, and your nails 
Sharpen into the cutlery 
That can dig you through. 
Nothing can wave you back. 
You are the maker of bridges. 
You bridge the sky and the earth. 
You let the air to tunnel down, 
The noon sun to spill into 
The darkness that blinds you. 
All day beneath the roots, 
You must dance, beneath 
The burrowing beetle 
Where the fallen bird has gone to fly, 
You, its only star. 
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